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Abstract 
 
English law has never developed a special regime for dealing with family assets and consequently has no 
notion of community of property. Whenever ownership of family assets are strictly in issue whether it be in 
the context of marriage or cohabitation regard is had to the ordinary rules governing property law which in 
our case rests upon the doctrine of separation of property. Grafted onto this basic position are the court’s 
wide distributive powers under the court can make property adjustment orders. 
 
Notwithstanding even more recent comments that prenuptial agreements are not enforceable it would be a 
mistake to think that English courts simply dismiss their relevance. Indeed, even before there had been 
indications that such agreements were a material consideration in deciding how property may be 
distributed after the divorce. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. General Background to the English Position 
 
To put the English position on prenuptial agreements into perspective some explanation of the 
general system for dealing with matrimonial property is required. In contrast to many (if not 
most) continental European legal systems, English law has never developed a special regime for 
dealing with family assets and consequently has no notion of community of property. Indeed in 
general (though see below in the context of Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 
24, [2006] 2 AC 618) it recognises no special concept of “family property” at all. Consequently 
whenever ownership of family assets are strictly in issue whether it be in the context of marriage 
or cohabitation regard is had to the ordinary rules governing property law which in our case 
rests upon the doctrine of separation of property which of course is the very opposite of the 
doctrine of community of property. 
 
Grafted onto this basic position are the court’s wide distributive powers conferred by Parliament 
through the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (as amended) (hereafter “MCA 1973”) which can be 
exercised upon the ending of the marriage through divorce or even nullity and now, through the 
Civil Partnership Act 2004, upon the dissolution of the civil partnership. Under these powers the 
court can make property adjustment orders (including the out and out transfer of ownership 
from one spouse to the other or even to any child of the family); it can order the property to be 
sold and direct to whom the proceeds should be paid; it can order the one-off payment of lump 
sums; it can order the sharing of pension rights and it can order continuing maintenance 
payments (known under English law as “periodical payments”) both in favour of the former 
spouse and of any child of the family.  
 
Not only are these powers wide ranging, effectively covering all aspects of family assets, but their 
exercise is subject to minimal statutory control. Indeed all the 1973 Act (through s 25) directs the 
court to do is 
 
(1) in deciding whether and how to exercise its powers “to have regard to all the 
circumstances of the case first [note, not paramount] consideration being given to the 
welfare while a minor or any child of the family who has not attained the age of 
eighteen”; 
 
(2) when exercising its powers “to consider whether it would be appropriate so to exercise 
those powers that the financial obligations of each party towards each other will be 
terminated as soon after the grant of the decree as the court considers just and 
reasonable” [the “clean breach” principle]; and 
 
(3) when exercising its powers: to have regard to each party’s current and potential income, 
earning capacity, property and other financial resources, their (and their children’s) 
financial needs, the family’s standard of living before the marital breakdown, the 
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spouses’ age and any disability, the duration of the marriage, each party’s contribution 
(past, present and future) to the welfare of the family (including looking after the home or 
caring for the family) and each party’s conduct insofar as it would be inequitable to 
disregard it. 
 
What is notably absent from the statutory guidance is any statement of what the overall object of 
the courts powers is. It was with this in mind that the House of Lords in White v White [2001] AC 
596 held that the underlying object was to achieve a fair outcome between the parties as judged 
against the yardstick of equality and without being biased in favour of the money-earner as 
against the home-make and the child-carer. This approach (which, at a stroke, removed the so-
called “glass ceiling” of any awards) has since been further refined by the House of Lords in 
Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane, above. That case recognised three principles upon which 
the redistribution of resources from one party to another following a divorce was justified, 
namely 
 
• the needs (primarily housing and financial) generated by the relationship between the 
parties. This is often where the search for fairness begins and ends since in most cases the 
available assets are insufficient to provide adequately for the needs of two homes; 
 
• compensation for relationship-generated disadvantage - women in particular may still 
suffer a disproportionate financial loss upon marital breakdown having sacrificed their 
careers looking after the home and family; and  
 
• sharing of the fruits of the matrimonial partnership of equals (sometimes referred to as 
“entitlement”).  
 
In this latter context their Lordships made a distinction between so-called “matrimonial 
property” – where the principle of equal sharing applies regardless of the duration of the 
marriage – and “non matrimonial property” which is not automatically shared since, in the 
words of Baroness Hale, “in a matrimonial property regime which started, as the English system 
did, with the premise of separate property, there remains some scope for one party to acquire 
and retain separate property”. This distinction can be critical in short marriages but as Lord 
Nicholls pointed out in longer marriages non matrimonial property represents a contribution 
made to the marriage by one of the parties which in any event in many cases diminishes over 
time. 
 
Precisely what amounts to non matrimonial property for these purposes generated a measure of 
disagreement though in general it refers to property brought into the marriage (other than that 
used as or to provide for the matrimonial home) and property acquired by gift or inheritance 
during the marriage. But whether it also includes business or investment assets that have been 
generated mainly or solely by the effect of one party admitted of different views nor were assets 
acquired after separation specifically considered. 
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The above mentioned debate, however, should not mask the basic fact that more or less all the 
spouses’ assets, however and whenever acquired, are subject to the court’s extraordinarily wide 
powers and are therefore at risk of being redistributed. This risk, one might have thought, makes 
the need to recognise prenuptial agreements all the more pressing. Yet, as will be seen, English 
law almost alone not only in Europe but also among other common law jurisdictions, has hitherto 
refused to recognise such agreements as binding. 
 
1.2. Clarification of Terms 
 
In considering the English position on prenuptial agreements it will be useful to clarify terms. By 
“prenuptial agreement” (also referred to as “antenuptial agreements”) is meant an agreement 
made before marriage concerning what is to happen to all the parties’ assets in the event of a 
divorce or separation. Although there must now be the equivalent “pre-civil partnership 
agreements” there has yet to be an established phrase for such agreements. One (perhaps 
frivolous) suggestion (Barton C, 2005, 994) is that they can be referred to as “pre-reggies” (as 
opposed to “pre-nups”); others (Harris-Short S and Miles J, 2007, 551) refer to them as “pre-cips”. 
Prenuptial agreements must be contrasted with “antenuptial settlements” (which are variable 
under MCA 1973, s 24) which seek to regulate the spouses’ financial affairs upon and during their 
marriage but which do not contemplate the dissolution of the marriage (per Wall J in N v N 
(Jurisdiction: Pre-Nuptial Agreement) [1999] 2 FLR 745 at 751-2). In turn these agreements are to be 
contrasted with “post separation agreements”, which are commonly negotiated during the 
divorce process, and which, though not binding, are positively encouraged. Finally, all the above, 
are to be contrasted with “cohabitation contracts” which, as their name implies, governs the 
parties’ position during and after cohabitation and in which neither marriage nor civil 
partnership is contemplated at all. 
 
 
2. Résumé of English Case-Law  
 
There is no formal statutory prohibition against the making nor indeed the enforcement of pre-
nuptial agreements. Section 34(1) of the MCA does, however, provide that insofar as a 
“maintenance agreement” purports to “restrict any right to apply for an order containing 
financial provisions” it is void, though it also states that “any other financial arrangements 
contained in the agreement shall not thereby be rendered void or unenforceable”. [There is now a 
similar provision concerning maintenance agreements between civil partners]. Strictly, pre-
nuptial agreements fall outside the scope of s 34 since they are made before the marriage and are 
not therefore made between spouses. However, it is no doubt implicit that the prohibition 
extends to all agreements whenever made that purport to oust the court’s jurisdiction. In any 
event, s 34(1)(a), a re-enactment of a series of provisions going back to s 1(2) of the Maintenance 
Agreements Act 1957, reflects the House of Lords’ decision in Hyman v Hyman [1929] AC 601 that 
no spousal maintenance agreement can preclude a spouse from applying for financial relief in 
divorce proceedings. Based upon the premise that the court’s power to order the husband to 
maintain his former wife after divorce was intended to protect not only her but also any third 
party dealing with her and indirectly the state since it may have had to support her, it was held 
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to be contrary to public policy to permit to oust the court’s jurisdiction. Put another way, as Lord 
Atkin said, the “wife’s right to future maintenance is a matter of public concern which she cannot 
barter away”. So stated, it is evident that the wide ratio of Hyman is that no matter when it is 
made an agreement it cannot oust the court’s jurisdiction. At any rate, it is generally taken as read 
that pre-nuptial agreements are not binding. As Wall J said in N v N (Jurisdiction: Pre-Nuptial 
Agreement) (above): 
 
 “The attitude of the English courts to antenuptial agreements… has always been that they are not 
enforceable. 
 
In fact the decision in N v N was especially strict since Wall J considered that the public policy 
argument applied to individual clauses even if they could be severed from the rest of the 
agreement. 
 
Illustrative of this standpoint is F v F (Ancillary Relief: Substantial Assets) [1995] 2 FLR 45, which 
seems to be the first reported English decision on pre-nuptial agreements (though in that case 
they were called “antenuptial contracts”). In that case under an agreement drawn up in Germany 
the wife of a millionaire would have been restricted to receiving the equivalent of a pension of a 
German judge, a result which Thorpe J (as he then was) dismissed as being “ridiculous”. 
Although he acknowledged that “contracts of this sort are commonplace in the society from 
which the parties come”, Thorpe J considered that in “this jurisdiction they must be of very 
limited significance”. 
 
Despite these two decisions and notwithstanding even more recent comments that prenuptial 
agreements are not enforceable (see, for example, C v C (Variation of Post-Nuptial Settlement) [2003] 
EWHC 742 (Fam), [2004] 2 FLR 1 in which Wilson J commented “Even nowadays, 
notwithstanding the law’s growing respect for properly negotiated prenuptial agreements, it is 
impossible to argue that they can succeed in ousting the jurisdiction of the court”) it would be a 
mistake to think that English courts simply dismiss their relevance. (Indeed, simply to ignore a 
prenuptial agreement could be thought to violate Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights as being an interference with the right to respect for private and family life). 
Indeed, even before N v N, referred to above, there had been indications that such agreements 
were a material consideration in deciding how property may be distributed after the divorce. In 
N v N (Foreign Divorce: Financial Relief) [1997] 1 FLR 900, for example, in a case involving Swedish 
nationals, it was held that while their prenuptial agreement was not conclusive in England (as it 
was in Sweden) it was nonetheless a material consideration to which the court should have 
regard in applying the criteria set out in the MCA 1973. More strikingly still, in S v S (Divorce: 
Staying Proceedings) [1997] 2 FLR 100 Wilson J said that there was a danger that the words of 
Thorpe J in F v F (referred to above) might be taken out of context. Looking to the future his 
Lordship added 
 
“There will come a case… where the circumstances surrounding the prenuptial 
agreement and the provisions therein contained might, when viewed in the context of 
other circumstances of the case prove influential or even crucial… I can find nothing in s 
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25 to compel a conclusion… at odds with personal freedoms to make agreements for 
ourselves… carefully struck by informed adults. It all depends”. 
 
Although Wilson J’s comments were obiter (as subsequently pointed out by Thorpe LJ in Ella v 
Ella [2007] EWCA Civ 99, [2007] 2 FLR 35) the clear thrust of the post-2000 case-law has been to 
confirm the basic proposition that prenuptial agreements are a material consideration in the post-
divorce redistribution of property exercise either as part of “all the circumstances” or as 
“conduct” (according to Connell J in M v M (Prenuptial Agreement [2002] 1 FLR 654 at 661) it does 
not matter which) which the court is directed to take into account under s 25 of the MCA 1973. 
Three cases illustrate the current position. In the first, K v K (Ancillary Relief: Prenuptial Agreement 
[2003] 1 FLR 120), the wife became pregnant and her mother pressured the husband to marry. 
Both parties came from wealthy backgrounds, the husband having wealth of around £25 million 
and the wife being a beneficiary of trusts valued at some £1 million. According to the prenuptial 
agreement, signed after each took legal advice, but without the husband making full disclosure, if 
the marriage ended within five years, the wife was to receive £100,000 from the husband (to be 
increased by 10% p.a. compound) and the husband was to make reasonable financial provision 
for any children. The agreement made no provision for periodical payments for the wife. The 
marriage ended after 14 months and the wife sought a lump sum of £1.6 million and periodical 
payments of £57,000p.a. for herself in addition to the £15,000 p.a. for their child. The husband 
offered a £120,000 lump sum (plus £600,000 to provide a home in which she could bring up the 
child). Given that the husband had agreed to marry the wife under pressure and upon the 
understanding that no capital claim in the event of an early termination of the marriage would be 
governed by their agreement, it was held that entry into the agreement constituted “conduct 
which it would be inequitable to disregard” under s 25(2)(g). Accordingly, it was decided that the 
capital element of the agreement should be upheld. However, it was thought wrong to confine 
provision to the wife to the husband’s offer, since it failed to recognise her role as the child’s 
mother. The court awarded the wife periodical payments of £15,000 p.a. It also ordered a lump 
sum of £1.2 million to be paid so as to provide the wife and child with a house that bore some 
relationship to the husband’s standard of living. 
 
The second and most recent of the illustrative decisions is Ella v Ella (above). In that case the 
spouses had dual British/Israeli nationality. They married in Israel in 1996 having made a 
prenuptial contract that provided for Israeli law to apply to any questions concerning their 
property and provided for separation of property with future assets belonging exclusively to the 
spouse creating them. The spouses made their marital home in London but in 2006 the marriage 
ran into difficulties and the wife petitioned for divorce in London. The husband countered by 
petitioning in Israel and in due course the Rabbinical court issued a consent order under which it 
would first determine the question of jurisdiction. Subsequently, on the husband’s without notice 
application, the Israeli court ruled that it had exclusive jurisdiction. The husband then sought a 
stay of the English proceedings. At first instance the husband succeeded, Macur J holding that in 
reaching the decision the prenuptial agreement was a “major factor”. This decision was upheld 
by the Court of Appeal. As Charles J (with whom Kay LJ agreed) said 
 
 “I agree with the submission made on behalf of the wife that absent the prenuptial agreement, this 
would be an English case and the husband would not be able to show that Israel was clearly the 
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appropriate forum. The judge clearly recognises the connecting factors connecting the family to Israel. In 
my judgment the judge was right to conclude that, taken together with those factors, the prenuptial 
agreement is a major factor in this case, and in my view it is one that results in Israel being clearly the 
more appropriate forum”. 
 
Ella is interesting on a number of counts: it is the first Court of Appeal decision in which a 
prenuptial agreement has been held to be relevant (though none of the judges made anything of 
that); it provides a rare example of a really influential role played by such an agreement, and it 
was held to be a major factor notwithstanding that the wife did not take independent legal advice 
before making the agreement (though in this respect it was acknowledged that the wife might not 
be deprived of a remedy in the English courts under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family 
Proceedings Act 1984). 
 
A third illustrative case, in fact the first to be decided out of the trilogy is M v M (Prenuptial 
Agreement) (above). Here the parties were Canadian. The woman became pregnant and the man 
was opposed to her having an abortion. She refused to have the child unless they married. But 
having undergone an acrimonious and expensive divorce from his first wife, the man refused to 
marry her unless she signed a prenuptial agreement he had had drawn up by his lawyers, under 
which the wife would receive £275,000 in the event of a divorce. Despite being advised by an 
independent experienced matrimonial lawyer not to do so the woman signed the agreement since 
that was the only way she was able to ensure that marriage went ahead as planned. The marriage 
lasted five years by which time the husband’s net worth was about £7.5 million. The wife sought 
£1.3 million. Connell J commented: 
 
“The circumstances of this case illustrate vividly that the existence of a prenuptial agreement can do 
more to obscure rather than clarify the underlying justice of the case. On the one hand this husband 
would not have married the wife unless she signed the agreement. On the other hand this wife signed 
the agreement because she was pregnant and did not relish single parenthood either for herself or for 
her child and because she wanted to marry the husband. In my view it would be as unjust to the 
husband to ignore the existence of the agreement and its terms as it would be to the wife to hold her 
strictly to those terms. I do bear the agreement in mind as one of the more relevant circumstances of this 
case, but the court’s overriding duty remains to attempt to arrive at a solution which is fair in all the 
circumstances, applying s 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973”. 
 
In the event Connell J ordered the husband to pay the wife £875,000 which because of the 
prenuptial agreement was “a more modest award than might have been made without it”. 
 
 
3. Should The English Position be Reformed? 
 
The current law on prenuptial agreements has attracted considerable comment from academics, 
judges and policy makers and serious consideration has been given to reforming the law.   
 
A key criticism of the current law is that it is paternalistic and anachronistic (see Clarke B, 2004; 
Harris-Short S and Miles J, 2007 at 7.9.2 and Lowe N and Douglas G, 2007, 1013-1014). It has been 
pointed out that when Hyman was decided wives did not then have full legal capacity and it 
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made sense to protect them. Now, however, since they do have full competence and particularly 
because marriage is regarded as a partnership of equals together with the doctrine of separation 
of property there should be full freedom for both parties to make their economic arrangements. It 
has in any event been further argued that the decision in Hyman is illustrative of the former law’s 
ambivalence about private agreements when as one commentary (Cretney C and Masson J, 1999, 
359a) has put it “the fact that the parties had come to an agreement between themselves was… 
regarded not as a matter of satisfaction but rather as something which should arouse the court’s 
vigilance”, i.e. to be satisfied that the divorce was not collusive. But again all this has changed: 
the parties are encouraged to settle their financial affairs amicably. Indeed, post separation 
financial agreements either made independently or as a result of financial dispute resolution 
appointment, whilst not strictly binding, are normally followed provided the court is satisfied 
that each party was properly and independently advised (as established by Edgar v Edgar [1980] 3 
All ER 887 and see Xydhias v Xydhias [1999] 1 FLR 683). Accordingly it can be argued that the law 
is wrong to treat prenuptial agreements differently. Furthermore, given that some of the 
sensitivities regarding prenuptial agreements are peculiar to marriage it is not absolutely certain 
that so-called “pre-cips” will be treated the same way. Yet it surely cannot be right to treat 
prenuptial and pre-cips agreements differently. That would only compound another awkward 
comparison, namely, the apparently developing recognition of cohabitation contracts at any rate 
with regard to financial arrangements contained therein (see Sutton v Mischon de Reya and Gawor 
and Co [2003] EWHC 3166 (ch ), [2004] 1 FLR 837)(though in this last respect it has been pointed 
out (Herring J, 2007, 243) that since there are no redistributive powers following the breakdown 
of cohabitation between unmarried couples cohabitation contracts cannot be said to be “robbing” 
the court of such power). 
 
In defence of the current position there are a number of so-called public policy arguments but, say 
advocates for reform, they are either unpersuasive or point to other alternatives for dealing with 
the problem. In the former category is the argument that prenuptial agreements diminish the 
importance/sanctity of marriage. But as Connell J said in M v M this is hardly a strong argument 
given the high number of divorces. Ironically it is now being said that the inability both of 
wealthy people and those already divorced to protect their already accrued property acts as a 
deterrent to marriage or remarriage. Indeed, some say that an ability to make binding prenuptial 
agreements could add stability to marriage second time round. In any event such binding 
agreements could lead to greater certainty and hence to reduced costs in the event of divorce. 
 
One concern commonly expressed about making prenuptial agreements binding is that they 
could inappropriately transfer the burden of maintaining an ex-spouse away from the individual 
onto the State. But so the argument goes, that problem could and should be dealt with by 
appropriate social security laws. Other issues include the adequate protection of children, the 
appropriateness of agreements made long ago or where circumstances have entirely changed, 
and protection of the weaker party. These problems could be solved respectively by dealing 
separately with children, having so-called “sunset clauses” or by simply relying on standard 
contractual principles such as duress, frustration and so on. Of course, as many have observed, 
the danger of making agreements binding is that the uncertainties and arguments are simply 
shifted onto the validity and meaning of the agreement as opposed to the current settlement 
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issues on divorce – thus negating the argument that prenups lead to greater certainty and thus 
reduced divorce costs. 
 
One further argument is that English law is simply out of line internationally, not just with the 
civil systems of continental Europe but also many common law systems as well. Australia, New 
Zealand have changed their laws relatively recently and Ireland are currently considering doing 
so (see e.g. Fehlberg B and Smyth B, 2002, 127 and the Report of the Study Group on Pre-nuptial 
agreements, 2007). In the European context there is, against the background of freedom of 
movement so dear to the EU, an arguable need for harmonisation. Is it fair that a couple having 
made a binding prenuptial agreement in one Member State should on divorcing in England find 
that the agreement can be totally undone? In his postscript to his judgment in Charman v Charman 
[2007] EWCA Civ 503, [2007] 1 FLR 1246 at [124] Potter P commented  
 
“The difficulty of harmonising our law concerning the property consequences of marriage and divorce 
and the law of civilian member states is exacerbated by the fact that our law has so far given little status 
to prenuptial contracts. If, unlike the rest of Europe, the property consequences of divorce are to be 
regulated by the principle of needs, compensation and sharing, should not the parties to the marriage, or 
the projected marriage, have at least the opportunity to order their own affairs otherwise by a nuptial 
contract?” 
 
How then have the English policy makers reacted to these type of arguments? 
 
In its Consultation Paper Supporting Families published in 1998 the government itself suggested 
that prenuptial agreements could usefully be made binding but subject to safeguards, namely, 
that the parties received independent legal advice before entering the agreement; that there be 
full disclosure of each parties’ assets and property before the agreement was made and that the 
agreement is made no fewer than 21 days before the marriage. Furthermore, the agreement 
would not have been binding if there was a child of the family whether or not that child was born 
at the time the agreement was made or where under the general law of contract the agreement 
would be unenforceable or, finally, where the agreement would cause significant injustice to one 
or both parties or a child of the marriage. These safeguards are so wide-ranging that most 
agreements would have difficulty negotiating the hurdle. Indeed the point has been made that 
Ella apart, all the English cases referred to would fail to do so. In other words, had the proposed 
reform been enacted it would have made little or no difference to the current law. In the event the 
proposal did not find favour apparently mainly because of concern that parties’ circumstances 
could change as time passed following the agreement so that it would be unfair to keep them to 
its terms and was abandoned. At one stage the majority of judges of the Family Division 
proposed that the terms of any prenuptial agreement should be made an additional factor for the 
court to take into account under s 25 of the MCA 1973. A minority would have gone further and 
provided that both pre and post nuptial agreements should be presumptively binding (see 
Wilson N, 1999 at 162-3). Building on that opinion, Resolution (the Solicitors’ Family Law 
Association, 2004) proposed that s 25 be amended so as to provide that agreements should be 
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considered binding “unless to do so will cause significant injustice to either party or to any child 
of the family”.1 
 
While this latter proposal might be useful inasmuch as it would at least potentially harmonise the 
approach to prenuptial agreements it seems doubtful that any of the decisions cited in this paper 
would have been decided differently had it been enacted which raises the question of whether 
any such reform is worth the candle. 
 
In any event does not English law have the best of all worlds, namely, to accept prenuptials as 
being a material consideration in deciding how to redistribute the family assets but not to being 
bound by them so as to prevent the court being able to do justice or more importantly able to 
avoid injustice between the parties? In this sense those continental systems which simply view 
prenuptial agreements as binding are surely too rigid and inflexible – a position, it is submitted, 
that is exposed by the trilogy of cases, F v F, K v K, M v M (discussed above) which I would argue 
were rightly decided. Whether there is a material difference between agreements which aim to 
set out or limit what assets each are to have and those such as Ella v Ella determining which law 
is to apply can possibly be debated. In principle, however, it is submitted that there is no real 
difference but then the author comes from a jurisdiction that espouses the lex fori approach! 
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